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Abstract—We establish a network formation game for the
Internet’s Autonomous System (AS) interconnection topology.
The game includes different types of players, accounting for the
heterogeneity of ASs in the Internet. We incorporate reliability
considerations in the player’s utility function, and analyze static
properties of the game as well as its dynamic evolution. We
provide dynamic analysis of its topological quantities, and explain
the prevalence of some “network motifs” in the Internet graph.
We assess our predictions with real-world data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a primary example of a large-scale, self
organized, complex system. Understanding the processes that
shape its topology would provide tools for engineering its
future.
The Internet is assembled out of multiple Autonomous
Systems (ASs), which are contracted by different economic
agreements. These, in turn, compose the routing pathways
among the ASs. With some simplifications, we can represent
the resulting network as a graph, where two nodes (ASs) are
connected by a link if traffic is allowed to traverse through
them. The statistical properties of this “Internet graph”, such
as the clustering properties, degree distribution etc., have
been thoroughly investigated [1]. However, without proper
understanding of the mechanism that led to this structure, the
statistical analysis alone lacks the ability to either predict the
future evolution of the Internet nor to shape its evolution.
A large class of models, a primary example is the “prefer-
ential attachment” model [2], use probabilistic rules in order
to simulate the network evolution and recover some of its
statistical properties. Yet, these models fail to account for
many other features of the network [3]. Possibly, one of the
main reasons for that is they treat the ASs as passive elements
rather than economic, profit-maximizing entities. Therefore,
an agent-based approach is a promising alternative.
Game theory is one of the main tools of the trade in
estimating the performance of distributed algorithms [4]. It
describes the behavior of interacting rational agents and the
resulting equilibria. Game theory has been applied extensively
to fundamental control tasks in communication networks, such
as flow control [5], network security [6], routing [7] and
wireless network design [8].
Recently, there has been increased activity in the field of
network formation games. These studies aim to understand
the network structure that results from interactions between
rational agents [9], [10]. Different authors emphasized dif-
ferent contexts, such as wireless networks [11] or the inter-
AS topology [12], [13]. The theme of such research is to
investigate the equilibria’s properties, e.g., establishing their
existence and obtaining bounds on the “price of anarchy”
and ”price of stability”. These metrics measure from above
and below, correspondingly, the social cost deterioration at
an equilibrium compared with a (socially) optimal solution.
Alternatively, agent-based simulations are used in order to
obtain statistical characteristics of the resulting topology [14].
Nonetheless, the vast majority of these studies assume that
the players are identical, whereas the Internet is a hetero-
geneous mixture of various entities, such as CDNs, minor
ISPs, tier-1 ASs etc. There are only a few studies that
have explicitly considered the effects of heterogeneity on the
network structure. Some examples include [13], which extends
a previous model of formation games for directed networks
[9], and in the context of social networks, [15]. The latter
describes a network formation game in which the link costs
are heterogeneous and the benefit depends only on a player’s
nearest neighbors (i.e., no spillovers).
Most of the studies on the application of game theory to
networks, with very few exceptions, e.g., [16], focused on
static properties of the game. This is particularly true for
network formation games. However, it is not clear that the
Internet has reached an equilibrium. Indeed, ASs continuously
draw new contracts, some merge with others while other
quit business. In fact, a dynamic inspection of the inter-AS
network suggests that the system may be far from equilibrium.
Therefore, a dynamic study of an inter-AS network formation
game is needed.
In addition, previous work ignores an important requirement
that Autonomous Systems has - reliability. Indeed, failures
occur, and an AS must face such events. While some game
theoretic works addressed reliability in other contexts [17],
[18], to the best of our knowledge, there are no works that
considered the topological properties that emerge in a hetero-
geneous, dynamic, network formation game with reliability
constraints.
We establish an analytically-tractable model, which ex-
plicitly accounts for the heterogeneity of players as well as
reliability requirements. We base our model on the heralded
Fabrikant model [19], [20], which was recently extended to
include heterogeneous players [21]. We model the inter-AS
connectivity as a network formation game with heterogeneous
players that may share costs by monetary transfers. We account
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for the inherent bilateral nature of the agreements between
players, by noting that the establishment of a link requires
the agreement of both nodes at its ends, while removing a
link can be done unilaterally. As reliability comes into play,
agents may require to be connected to other agents, or to all
the other agents in the network, by at least two disjoint paths.
We investigate both the static properties of the resulting game
as well as its dynamic evolution.
Game theoretic analysis is dominantly employed as a “toy
model” for contemplating about real-world phenomena. It is
rarely confronted with real-world data. In this study we go
a step further from traditional formal analysis, and we do
consider real inter-AS topology data analysis to support our
theoretical findings.
The main contributions of our study are as follows:
• In the context of network formation games, we provide
a theoretical framework that introduces reliability con-
straints. We discuss both the case of frequent failures,
where the fall-back pathways are as frequently used as
the main pathways, as well as the case of rare crashes.
• We introduce the concept of "price of reliability", which
is defined as the ratio of the social cost with reliability
constraints to the social cost with no such additional
constraints. Surprisingly, we show that this price can be
smaller than one, namely, that the additional reliability
requirements may increase the social utility.
• We provide dynamical analysis of topological quantities,
and explain the prevalence of some “network motifs”,
i.e., sub-graphs that appear frequently in the network.
Through real-world data, we provide encouraging support
to our predictions.
In the next section, we describe our model. We discuss
alternative variants that address different failure frequencies or
whether utility transfers (e.g., monetary transfers) are allowed
or not; we address both the case of allowing utility (i.e.,
monetary) transfers as well as the case where this is not pos-
sible. Next, in Section 3, we provide static analysis. Dynamic
analysis is presented in Section 4. In section 5 we compare
our theoretical predictions with real-world data on inter-AS
topologies. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 6.
II. MODEL
We assume that each AS is a player. While there are many
types of players, following [21], we aggregate them into two
types: major league (or type-A) players, such as major ISPs,
central search engines and the likes, and minor league (or type-
B) players, such as local ISP or small enterprises. Each player,
regardless of its type, may form contracts with other players,
and should they reach a mutual understanding, a link between
them is formed. A player’s strategy is set by specifying which
links it is interested in establishing, and, if permissible, the
price it will be willing to pay for each. In order to maintain
reliable routing pathways, players may be required to sustain at
least two disjoint paths to other players or a subset of players.
We denote the set of type-A (type B) player by TA ( TB).
A link connecting node i to node j is denoted as either (i, j)
or ij. The total number of players is N = |TA| + |TB |, and
we assume N ≥ 3. The shortest distance between nodes i
and j is the minimal number of hops along a path connecting
them and is denoted by d(i, j). Finally, The degree of node i
is denoted by deg(i).
A. Basic model
Our cost function is based on the cost structure in [19] and
[20]. Players are penalized for their distance from other play-
ers. First and foremost, players require a good, fast connection
to the major players, while they may relax their connection
requirements to minor players. Bandwidth usage and delay
depends heavily on the hop distance, and connection quality
is represented by this metric. Similarly to [21], we weight
the relative importance of a major player by a factor A > 1
in the cost function in the corresponding distance term. The
link prices represent factors such as the link’s maintenance
costs, bandwidth allocation costs etc. Different player types
may incur different link costs, cA, cB , due to varying financial
resources or infrastructure.
All ASs must maintain access to the Internet in case of
a single link failure. This is tantamount to the requirement
that all the players must have at least two disjoint paths to
each other node. Nevertheless, if either link prices are high,
crash frequencies are low or the content of a minor AS is
of little value, players may relax their reliability requirements
and demand the establishment of disjoint paths only to the
major players. This is represented in the cost function by
a control parameter τ , which is set to one if two disjoint
paths are required to all nodes, and zero if the requirement
holds for (other) nodes of major players only. Conversely,
if failures are often, then the regular and backup paths (in
the corresponding pair of disjoint paths) are used almost as
frequently. As such, they must be weighted the same in the
cost function. Therefore, the distance cost is composed of two
terms, one represents the distance along the primary path and
the other represents the distance along the backup path. The
relative weight of these two terms is set by a parameter δ. If
failures are frequent and the likelihood of using either route is
the same, we have δ = 1. However, if failures are rare, traffic
will be mostly carried across the shorter path. Therefore its
length should carry more weight in the cost than the length of
the backup route, hence δ  1. This motivates the following
cost function.
Definition 1. Two paths, R(i,j) = (i, x1, x2, ...j) and R′(i,j) =
(i, x′1, x
′
2, ...j) are disjoint if they have no node in common,
namely if the unordered sets satisfy
{x1, x2, ...} ∩ {x′1, x′2, ...} = ∅.
The cost function C(i) of node i of type β ∈ {A,B}, is
defined as:
Cβ(i) , deg(i) · cβ + A
1 + δ
∑
j∈TA
(d(i, j) + δd′(i, j))
+τ · 1
1 + δ
∑
j∈TB
(d(i, j) + δd′(i, j))
+ (1− τ)
∑
j∈TB
d(i, j)
where d(i, j) and d′(i, j) are the lengths of a pair of disjoint
paths between i, j that minimizes the cost function. d(i, j)
denotes the length of the shorter path. Formally, denote a
pair of disjoint paths connecting player i and player j as(
R(i,j), R
′
(i,j)
)
α
, where dα(i, j) (d′α(i, j)) is the length of
shorter (correspondingly, longer) path. Set(
Rˆ(i,j), Rˆ′(i,j)
)
= arg min(
R(i,j),R
′
(i,j)
)
α
Cβ(i)
then d(i, j) =
∥∥∥Rˆ(i,j)∥∥∥ and d′(i, j) = ∥∥∥Rˆ′(i,j)∥∥∥.
If there is not pair of disjoint path player i and player j, then
d′(i, j) = Q, with Q →∞.If there is not a path connecting
players i and j we also have d(i, j) = Q.
For convenience, we set c , (cA + cB) /2. We assume
cA ≤ cB . The social cost is the sum of individual costs,
S = ∑Cβ(i). We denote the optimal (minimal) social cost as
Soptimal, and the social cost at the optimal stable solution is
S˜optimal. The price of stability is the ratio between the social
cost at the best stable solution and its value at the optimal
solution, namely PoS = S˜optimal/Soptimal. Similarly, denote
by S˜pessimal the highest social cost in an equilibrium. Then,
the price of anarchy is the ratio between the social cost at
the worst stable solution and its value at the optimal solution,
namely PoA = S˜pessimal/Soptimal.
Note that the requirement of disjoint node paths generalizes
the requirement of disjoint link paths and protects against link
failures within an Autonomous System. All of our results
apply to both notions of disjoint path (except a refinement
of Theorem 15; see the discussion there). For simplicity and
generality we shall use the notion of a disjoint node paths.
Definition 2. We denote the change in cost of player i as after
the addition (removal) of a link (j, k) by ∆C(i, E + jk) ,
C (i, E ∪ (j, k))−C (i, E) (correspondingly, ∆C(i, E−jk) ,
C (i, E) − C (i, E \ (j, k))) . The abbreviation ∆C(i, jk) is
often used.
If δ = 1, then the two routing pathways are used the same.
In this case, the shortest cycle length d(i, j) + d′(i, j) is the
relevant quantity that appears in the cost function. This can
be found in polynomial time by using Suurballe’s algorithm
[22], [23]. However, if δ  1, routing will occurs along two
disjoint paths, such that the length of the shortest between the
two is shortest (among all pairs of disjoint paths). Although
the complexity of finding this pair is NP-Hard, first finding
the shortest path and then finding the next shortest path is a
heuristic that works remarkably well, both in the real-world
data analysis and on the networks obtained in the theoretical
discussion. The reason behind this is that, when failures are
rare, information is predominantly routed along the shortest
path. When players are required to establish a fall-back route,
they will establish a path that is disjoint from the current
routing path, namely the shortest one.
The establishment of a link requires the bilateral agreement
of the two parties at its ends, while removing a link can
be done unilaterally. This is known as a pairwise-stable
equilibrium[10], [16].
Definition 3. The players’ strategies are pairwise-stable if for
all i, j ∈ TA ∪ TB , the following hold:
a) if ij ∈ E, then ∆C(i, E − ij) > 0;
b) if ij /∈ E, then either ∆C(i, E + ij) > 0 or ∆C(j, E +
ij) > 0.
The resulting graph is referred to as a stabilizable graph.
The additional reliability requirements result in additional
link expenses, as for example, the degree of every node
needs to be at least two. The price of reliability is the
ratio between the optimal social cost under the additional
survivability constraint to the optimal social cost when the
additional constraints are removed.
Definition 4. The cost function,C(bare)β (i), of node i of type
β ∈ {A,B}, is obtained by setting δ = 0, τ = 0 in Definition
1 and requiring the existence of only a single path from player
i to any other players in the network. Denote the optimal
social cost without the additional survivability requirement in a
pairwise stable equilibrium as S˜(bare)optimal. The price of reliability
(PoR) is the ratio between the optimal value of the social costs
among the set of stable equilibria, PoR = S˜optimal/S˜
(bare)
optimal.
Surprisingly, we shall show that there exist scenarios in
which reliability requirements increase the social utility, so
that the price of reliability can be smaller than one.
B. Utility transfer
Thus far, it was implicitly assumed that utility transfer is not
feasible. Nevertheless, often players are able to transfer utility,
for example via monetary transactions. An extended model
that incorporates such transfers is introduced by allowing for
a monetary transaction in which player i pays player j some
amount Pij iff the link (i.j) is established [21]. Player j sets
some minimal price wij and should Pij ≥ wij the link is
formed.
Definition 5. The cost function of player i when monetary
transfers are allowed is C˜(i) , C(i) +
∑
j,ij∈E (Pij − Pji).
We recall the observation in [21] that, without transfers, a
link will be established only if both parties, i and j, reduce
their costs, C(i, E+ ij) < 0 and C(j, E+ ij) < 0. But, when
monetary transfers are allowed, an edge will be established if
(and only if) the relaxed condition ∆C(i, E+ij)+∆C(i, E+
ij) < 0 holds. In game theoretic terms, this condition is
equivalent to the requirement that the core of the two players
game is non-empty.
Corollary 6. When monetary transfers are allowed, the link
(i, j) is established iff ∆C(i, E + ij) + ∆C(j, E + ij) < 0.
The link is removed iff ∆C(i, E − ij) + ∆C(j, E − ij) > 0.
In the remainder of the paper, whenever monetary transfers
are feasible, we will state it explicitly, otherwise the basic
model (without transfers) is assumed.
III. STATIC ANALYSIS
We shall now analyze the properties of stable equilibria,
such as the price of anarchy, which is the ratio between the
social cost at the worst stable solution and its value at the
optimal solution, and the price of stability, which is the ratio
between the social cost at the best stable solution and its value
at the optimal solution. We shall further discuss topological
properties that emerge from our analysis.
It was shown in [19] that if c < 1 the only stable solution
is a clique and in [21] it was shown that if cA < A then
the major players form a clique. One may have guessed that
reliability requirements, which generally induce the creation
of additional, backup edges, would ease the formation of the
clique. The next proposition shows that this naive assumption
is wrong, and in fact, as the frequency of failure increases, it
becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the major player’s
clique. Consider a dense set, in which every player may access
all the other players within two hops by a at least two disjoint
paths. A direct link between two players only reduces their
mutual distance by one, and does not affect any other distance.
If this link fails often, it may be used only partially, and it may
not be worthy to pay its cost. Hence, in this setting, counter
intuitively, frequent failures end up with a sparser network.
Proposition 7. Assume the frequency of failures is high,
namely δ = 1. Then, the type-A players form a clique if
and only if cA < A/2. Allowing monetary transfers does not
change the result.
Proof: We consider a major player’s clique and ask under
which conditions the removal of a link is a worthy move.
Consider an edge (i, j) in this clique. Since only the shortest
distance between players i and j is affected, and is increased
by one, the type-A players clique is stable if and only if
A/ (1 + δ) < cA.
As the major players (tier-1 AS) form a densely connected
set, a clique-like subgraph, in the rest of the paper we shall
only consider the case where cA < A/2. We also assume,
trivially, that cB > 1, as otherwise the only stabilizable
network is a clique.
The next proposition describes a scenario in which, surpris-
ingly, the additional reliability constraints reduce the social
cost.
Proposition 8. Assume 1 < cA < A/2 and symmetric
reliability requirements, namely τ = 1. Then, the optimal
network is composed of a type-A clique, where all the type
B nodes are connected to all members of the type-A clique,
as depicted in Fig. 1. This network is not stabilizable, and
PoS > 1. Nevertheless, for |TB |  |TA|  1, we have
PoS → 1. In addition, the Price of Reliability is smaller than
one.
Figure 1. The optimal solution when 1 < cA < A/2 and τ = 1, according
to Prop. 8. The type-B players are in red circles. The type-A clique is in blue
squares.
The main idea behind this result is that in the optimal, yet
unstable solution, every minor player establishes a link with
all the major players (Fig. 1). This configuration is unstable
as it is over-saturated with links, and the optimal stable
solution is obtained by diluting this network so that every
minor player will connect to just two major players. If the
reliability requirements are further removed, then additional
dilution occurs, increasing the social cost. In other words,
the stable configuration is under-saturated with edges, and the
additional survivability requirements facilitate the formation
of additional links.
Proof: ï¿œ ï¿œ We shall now prove the first part of
this theorem, namely that the network described in Fig. 1,
is optimal in terms of social cost. In this network, every type-
B player is connected to every type-A player. We denote this
network by G.
First, consider a network in which the type-A players are
not in a clique. Then, there exists two players i, j ∈ TA such
that d(i, j) ≥ 2. By establishing a link (i, j) the change in
social cost is
∆S ≤ −2
(
A
1 + δ
− cA
)
< 0.
Therefore a network which includes this link has a lower social
cost. Hence, in the optimal network, all the type-A players
are in clique. A similar calculation for a missing link between
player i ∈ TA and j ∈ TB shows that
∆S ≤ −
(
A+ 1
1 + δ
− cA − cB
)
< 0
and establishing this link reduces the social cost as well. In
conclusion, in an optimal network a type-A player is connected
to all the other players.
Consider node i ∈ TB . Its distance from every other node
j ∈ TB is d(i, j) = 2 and d′(i, j) = 2. The minimal distances
between two minor players i, j ∈ TB are d(i, j) = 1 and
d′(i, j) = 2 whereas in G we have d(i, j) = d′(i, j) = 2.
Assume that a network with a lower social cost exists, and
denote it by G′. In G′ there must exists a link between two
type-B players, i, j ∈ TB . However, removing this link reduces
the social cost, as
S(E + ij)− S(E) = 2
(
A
1 + δ
− c
)
> 0
Therefore, G′ is not optimal, in contradiction to our assump-
tion. This proves that G is optimal.
Next, we are going to show G is unstable. Consider i ∈ TB
and x ∈ TA. By removing (i, x) we cost change of player x
is
∆C(x,E − ix) = −2
(
1
1 + δ
− c
)
> 0
And therefore it is beneficial for player x to remove this
link. Hence, this network in not stabilizable.
Finally, we are going to show that the PoR < 1. The outline
is as follows. First, we are going to show that the network
depicted in Fig. 3 is stable. The optimal stable network
(without reliability requirements) in this parameter regime was
explicitly derived in [21]. We are going to show that the cost
in the latter network is higher than the former, which bound
the PoR from above by a value smaller than one.
Consider a network in which all the minor players are
connected to two major players, x, y ∈ TA. We are going
to show that this network is stable. Clearly, as shown before,
the type-A clique is stable. In addition, for any player i ∈ TB
neither x, y nor i has the incentive to remove either (x, i) or
(y, i) as it would violate the reliability requirement and would
lead to unbounded cost. Hence, this network is stable. Denote
this network by G˜. In [21] it was shown that the optimal stable
network (without reliability requirements) in this configuration
is the network in which all type-A players form a clique, and
all the type-B players are connected to a single type-A player.
We denote the latter network by G′′.We have
S(G˜.)− S(G′′) = |TB |
(
A+ 1
1 + δ
− cA − cB
)
< 0.
But,
PoR =
S˜optimal
S˜
(bare)
optimal
≤ S(G˜.)S(G′′) = 1 +
S(G˜.)− S(G′′)
S(G′′) < 1.
This concludes the proof.
In conclusion, if the failure frequency is high, the surviv-
ability requirements will induce dilution of the clique of major
players. However, the opposite effect occurs along the graph
cut-set between the set of minor players and the set of major
players, where the additional constraints lead to an increased
number of links connecting major and minor players.
So far we have assumed that the reliability requirements
are symmetric. As explained in the Introduction, in some
cases it is reasonable to assume that players will require a
backup route only to the major players, i.e., non-symmetric
reliability constraints. We shall now show that in this case,
the social cost may deteriorate considerably. Hence, from a
system designer point of view, it is much more important to
incentivize a configuration where the reliability requirements
are symmetric, than to reduce failure frequency globally. This
result stems from the following lemma.
Lemma 9. If τ 6= 0 then for every two nodes i,j, d(i, j) ≤
d′(i, j) ≤ 2 + 2cB . If τ = 0 there exists stable equiliberia
such that there are no two disjoint paths between some nodes
i, j.
Proof: First, we are going to show that d′(i, j) is finite
(step 1). Then, in the second step, we shall bound d′(i, j) from
above.
Note, that if there aren’t two disjoint paths between players
i and j, it is beneficial for both players to add the link (i, j)
and form a path.
Step 1: If i and j are disconnected, then it is worthy for
both of them to establish the link (i, j). Therefore, there exists
a path from i to j and d(i, j) is finite. Assume d(i, j) 6= 1.
If there aren’t two disjoint paths between nodes i and j, it
is worthy for both nodes to establish a direct link. Hence if
d(i, j) 6= 1 the distance d′(i, j) is finite. We now discuss the
case d(i, j) = 1 and show there must exists an additional
disjoint path, so d′(i, j) is finite. We prove by negation.
Take node x 6= i, j. As before, both d(i, x) and d(x, j) are
finite. Consider the following two cases:
A) d(i, x) = 1, d(x, j) = 1. Then, the trajectory (i, x, j)
is disjoint from the path (i, j), and it is therefore worthy for
both player i and player j to establish the link (i, j). Hence
d′(i, j) is finite.
B) d(i, x) = 1, d(x, j) 6= 1 or d(i, x) 6= 1, d(x, j) = 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume the first case. According
to the previous discussion, there are at least two disjoint paths
from x to j. Since they are disjoint, only one of them may
contain the edge (i, j). Therefore, there exist a path (i, x, ...j)
that is disjoint from the edge (i, j) and therefore d′(i, j) is
finite.
C) d(i, x) 6= 1, d(x, j) 6= 1 . Applying the same reasoning
as in B), there exists a path from i to x that is disjoint from
the edge (i, j). Likewise, there exists a path from j to x that
is disjoint from the edge (i, j). Therefore there exist a path
from i to j that is disjoint from (i, j).
Step 2: Step 1 has shown that every two nodes are connected
by a cycle. Let us assume the longest shortest cycle connecting
two nodes is of length l > 2 + 2cB > 3, namely there exists
a cycle (x0, x1, x2, ..., xbl/2c, ...xl, x0).
By establishing the link (x0, xbl/2c) the cost of player x0
due to distances from other players is reduced by at least(
l2 − 1 +mod(l + 1, 2)) /4, hence the link will be established
as
∆C
(
x0, E + (x0, xbl/2c
) ≤ (l2 − 1 +mod(l + 1, 2))−cB ≤ 0
and similarly ∆C
(
x0, E + (x0, xbl/2c
) ≤ 0 . Since
d(i.j) ≤ d′(i.j) ≤ l the proof is complete.
If there exist players with no two disjoint paths in an
equilibrium, then the social cost becomes unbounded. This
immediately results in an unbounded Price of Anarchy, as
indicated by the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Consider a network such that TB  TA  1.
The Price of Anarchy is as follows:
A) In a setting with asymmetric reliability requirements
(τ = 0): unbounded.
B) In a setting with symmetric reliability requirements (τ 6=
0): bounded by o(c).
Proof: A) We shall prove this by showing that there exists
a stable equilibrium with unbounded social cost. Consider a
network in which the major players (type-A players) form a
clique, while every minor player is connected only to a single
type-A player j ∈ TA. We shall show that this network is
stabilizable. As discusses before, the type-A clique is stable.
Consider i ∈ TB . By forming the link (i, x) the change of
cost of player x ∈ TA, x 6= j is
∆C(x, ix) = cA − 1 > 0.
Hence, this link will be formed. No additional links be-
tween minor players will be established, since such a link
only reduces the distance between the participating parties
by one, cB − 1 > 0 and does not provide an additional
disjoint path to the type-A clique. Therefore, the social cost
is S = ω(Q)→∞.
B) The total cost due to the inter-connectivity of the type-
A clique is identical for all link stable equilibria and is
|TA| (|TA| − 1) (c+ (1 + δ/2)A). This cost is composed of
|TA − 1| links per node, and the distance cost to every other
major nodes,
d(i, j) + d′(i, j) = 1 + δ/2.
Next, we evaluate the cost due to the type-B nodes inter-
distances. According to Lemma 9, both d(i, j) ≤ 4cB and
d′(i, j) ≤ 4cB , so the cost due to the inter-distances between a
type-B player and every other player is bounded from above by
4cB (|TA|+ |TB |). When summed up over all minor players,
this contributes a term 4cB |TB | (|TA|+ |TB |) to the social
cost. Likewise, the cost of links that at least one of their ends
is a type B player is at most cB |TB | (|TA|+ |TB |).
Therefore, the maximal cost in all link stable equilibria is
bounded from above by
|TA| (|TA| − 1) (c+ (1 + δ/2)A) + 5cB |TB | (|TA|+ |TB |) .
The optimal network configuration is described in Proposi-
tion 8. It is straightforward to evaluate the social cost in this
configuration. The distance cost due to inter-distances of the
type-B players is
2|TB | (|TB − 1) ,
while the cost of all links which connect type-B players to
type-A players is
|TB ||TA| (cB + cA) .
Finally, the social cost due to the type-A clique remains the
same, so finally we obtain that the minimal social cost is
Soptimal = |TA| (|TA| − 1) (c+ (1 + δ/2)A)
+2|TB | (|TB − 1) + 2|TB ||TA| (cB + cA)
By taking the limits |TA| → ∞, |TB |/|TA| → ∞ we obtain
that PoA ≤ 5cB/2.
A stable equilibrium with infinite social cost can be easily
achieved by considering a network where all minor players are
connected to a single, designated, major player. There exists a
single path of at most two hops between every minor player to
every major player. However, as the stability requirements are
asymmetric, the major players have no incentive to establish
additional routes to any minor player, and the reliability
requirements of the minor players remain unsatisfied.
A. Monetary transfers
The previous discussion assumed that a player cannot
compensate other players for an increase in their costs. Yet,
contracts between ASs often do involve monetary transac-
tions. Accordingly, in this subsection we shall highlight the
additional insights that are obtained when utility transfers are
permissible.
Our first result indicates that, in this setting, in contrast
to the previous setting, there always exists a fallback route
between every two players, regardless of the symmetric or
asymmetric nature of the additional survivability constraints.
If monetary transfers are feasible, players may compensate
other players for the cost of additional links such that all
the additional constraints are satisfied. Hence, symmetry is
less important than in the previous scenario. Furthermore,
this result suggests that every player is connected to every
other player by a cycle. The following proposition shows that
the maximal cycle length decays with the number of major
players. As the number of ASs increases in time, this predicts
that this length should decrease in time. We shall verify this
prediction in Section V.
Proposition 11. Assume 1 < c < A/2 . Then, every two
players are connected by a cycle, and the maximal cycle length
connecting a major player to a minor player is bounded by
max
{
2
(⌊√
(A|TA|)2 + 5c−A|TA|
⌋
+ 1
)
, 4
}
.
Proof: Lemma 9 showed that the maximal distance be-
tween players is bounded. We are going to tighten this result in
the regime where monetary transfers are feasible. Denote the
maximal distance between type-A player and a type_B player
by kA.
First, we are going to show that the maximal cycle length
connecting a major player and a minor player is 2kA + 1.
This follows from a simple geometric argument. Consider two
players, i ∈ TA and j ∈ TB . Assume kA > 2. If the cycle
length is 2kA + 2 or greater, there exists a type-B node that
its distance kA+1, in contradiction to the assumption that the
maximal distance between a major player and and a minor
player is kA. Denote maximal distance between two minor
players by kB . A similar argument shows that maximal cycle
length between two minor players is 2kB + 1.
Next, are going to show that the maximal distance con-
necting a major player and a minor player is kA ≤
l ≤ max
{
2
⌊√
(A|TA|)2 + 5c−A|TA|
⌋
, 2
}
. We prove by
negation. Assume that the distance between player j ∈ TA
and i ∈ TB is l. Denote the nodes on the path as (x0 =
i, x1, x2...., xl = j). Then, by establishing a link between
them, the distance between j and {x0, x1....xbl/2c} (similarly,
and distance between player i and players {xdl/2e...xl−1}) is
reduced. In addition, player i reduces its distance to every
node of the type-A clique by l. Lemma 25 of [21] shows that
the total reduction in distance is
(
l2 − 1 +mod(l + 1, 2)) /4.
Then, by establishing the link (i, j) we have
∆C(i, E+ij)+∆C(j, E+ij) ≤ cA+cB−2
(
l2 − 1)− l|TA|
and as l ≥ 2
⌊√
(A|TA|)2 + 5c−A|TA|
⌋
this expression
is negative. Therefore, the link will be established, and the
maximal shortest distance between a major player and a minor
player is smaller than l. This concludes the proof.
Our second result is based on the first one, and shows
that the price of anarchy is bounded. In fact, as the network
grows, Proposition 11 also indicates that its diameter shrinks.
Therefore, in the large network limit, the price of anarchy is
bounded by a constant.
Proposition 12. The price of anarchy is bounded by o(c).
Furthermore, if |TB |  1, |TA|  1 then the price of anarchy
is upper bounded by 2.
Proof: In Proposition 11’s proof we showed that the
maximal distance between a major player a minor player is
bounded by
l ≤ max
{
2
⌊√
(A|TA|)2 + 5c−A|TA|
⌋
, 2
}
It immediately follows that in the large network limit, as
l ≤ 2, every player is directly connected to a player that,
in turn is connected to the type-A players. The latter can be
either a major player, as part of the clique, or a minor player
that is connected to every player in the major player’s clique.
Note that a link between any two players yi and yj reduces
the social cost, since it at least lowers the costs of yi of yj
and can only reduce the costs of other players. Therefore, we
can bound the social cost by a configuration in which every
type-B player has the minimal number of links, namely two,
is at distance two from every major player.
Therefore, the worst social cost in bounded by
S ≤ |TA| (|TA| − 1) (c+ (1 + δ/2)A)
+2c|TB |+ 2|TB | (|TB − 1)
Comparing this bound with Soptimal, as derived in Propo-
sition 8, in the limit |TA| → ∞, |TB |/|TA| → ∞ completes
the proof.
IV. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
The Internet undergoes continuous transformations, such
as the emergence of new ASs, or formation of new traffic
contracts. In fact, it may very well be out of equilibrium.
Therefore, a static analysis of the equilibrium points must
be accompanied by dynamic analysis. Accordingly, our main
focus in this section is to identify prevalent network motifs
[24], i.e., small sub-graphs that emerge during the natural
evolution of the network. In Section V we shall show that
these motifs are indeed ubiquitous in the real AS topology,
and the frequency of their occurrences is few folds more than
expected in a random network.
While there are many possible equiliberia, we shall show
that convergence occurs only to just a few. We shall also show
that the convergence time is short, namely linear in the number
of players.
We start the discussion by setting up the dynamic frame-
work, as first formulated in [21].
A. Setup & Definitions
We split the game into turns, where at each turn only a
single player is allowed to remove or initiate the formation of
links. At each point in time, or turn, the players that already
joined the game form a subset N ′ ⊂ TA ∪ TB . We shall
implicitly assume that the cost function is calculated with
respect to the set N ′ of players that are already present in the
network. Each turn is divided into moves, at each of which
a player either forms or removes a single link. A player’s
turn is over when it has no incentive to perform additional
moves. Note that disconnections of several links can be done
unilaterally and hence iteratively.
Definition 13. Dynamic Rule #1: In player i’s turn it may
choose to move m ∈ N times. In each move, it may remove
a link (i, j) ∈ E or, if player j agrees, it may establish the
link (i, j). Player j would agree to establish (i, j) iff C(j;E+
(i, j))− C(j;E) < 0.
According to this definition, during player’s i turn, all the
other players will act in a greedy, rather than strategic, manner.
For example, although it may be that player j prefers that
a link (i, j′) would be established for some j′ 6= j, if we
adopt Dynamic Rule #1 it will accept the establishment of the
less favorable link (i, j). In other words, the active player has
the advantage of initiation and the other players react to its
offers. There are numerous scenarios in which players cannot
fully forecast other players’ moves and offers, e.g., when
information is asymmetric or when only partial information
is available [25]. In these settings, it is likely that a greedy
strategy will become the modus operandi of many players.
This is a prevalent strategy also when the system evolves
rapidly and it is difficult to assess the current network state
and dynamics.
In a dynamic network formation game, a key question is:
Can a player temporarily disconnects itself from the graph,
only to reconnect after getting to a better bargaining position?
Or must a player stay connected? If the timescale in which the
costs are evaluated is comparable to the timescale in which
the dynamics occur, then, clearly, a player will not disconnect
from the network voluntarily. However, if the latter is much
shorter, it may, for a very brief time, disconnect itself from the
graph in order to perform some strategic move. The following
rules address the two alternative limits.
Definition 14. Dynamic Rule #2a: Let the set of links at the
current move m be denoted as Em. A link (i, j) will be added
if i asks to form this link and C(j;Em + ij) < C(j;Em). In
addition, any link (i, j) can be removed in move m.
Dynamic Rule #2b: In addition to Dynamic Rule #2a, player
i would only remove a link (i, j) if C(i;Em−ij) > C(i;Em)
and would establish a link if both C(j;Em + ij) < C(j;Em)
and C(i;Em + ij) < C(i;Em)
According to Dynamic Rule #2a, a player is allowed to
perform a strategic plan in which the first few steps will
increase its cost, as long as when the plan is completed its
cost will be reduced. On the other hand, if the game follows
Dynamic Rule #2b, then a player’s cost must be reduced at
each move, hence such multi-move plan is not possible.
B. Basic Model - Results
Our first result in this section shows that, during the
natural evolution of the network, a “double star” sub-graph,
or network motif, often emerges. In the “double star” motif,
as depicted in Fig. 2, there exists a primary and a secondary
star. All the minor players are connected to the primary star’s
center. Part of the players are also connected to the other
star’s center, forming the secondary star. Consider a region
where it is immensely difficult to establish a link to a major
player, either due to geographical distance, link prices or
perhaps additional physical links are simply not accessible.
Nevertheless, in order to maintain a reliable connection, there
must be at least two links that connect this region to the
Internet backbone via some major players. In order to provide
a stable, fault tolerant service, every player in this region will
form links with the players hosting the endpoints of these
links, forming the double star sub-graph. Assume now that
link prices reduce over time, or that the importance of a fast
connection to the Internet core increases in time. In this case,
players may decide to establish direct links with the major
players, and remove either one of both links connecting them
to the star centers. Note though, that players will be reluctant
to disconnect from the star center if the number of nodes in
the star is large.
Moreover, the next theorem also shows that, eventually, and
fairly quickly, the system will converge to either the optimal
stable state, or to a state in which the social cost is a low
multiple of the optimal social cost.
Theorem 15. Assume symmetric reliability requirements, i.e.,
τ = 1. If the players follow Dynamic Rules #1 and #2a, then,
in any playing order:
A) The system converges to either the optimal stable state,
depicted in Fig. 3, or to the network depicted in Fig. 2.
B) In the large network limit, namely, when |TB |  |TA| 
1, the social costs ratio satisfy S/Soptimal < 3/2 + , with
→ 0.
C) If players play in a uniformly random order, the prob-
ability that the system has not converged by turn t decays
Figure 2. A network configuration which includes a “double-star” structure
of minor players. Every node in the primary star (encircled in yellow) is
linked to a major player, node k (in green). A direct link connects the two
star centers, denoted by 1 and 2 (in pink). The members in the secondary star
(in purple) are connected to both star centers. In addition, there secondary
star center is also connected to the major player k. There might be additional
minor players outside the stars (in red). Needless to say, the type-A clique
(square boxes) is also present.
d(i, j) i ∈ n1 i ∈ n2 i ∈ n3
j = 1 1 1 2
j ∈ S1 2 2 2
j = 2 2 1 2
j ∈ S2 2 2 3
j ∈ L 2 2 2
j = k 1 2 1
j = k’ 2 2 1
j ∈ D2, j 6= k, k′ 2 2 2
j ∈ TA, j /∈ D2 2 3 2
Table I
THE SHORTEST DISTANCE d(i, j) BETWEEN TWO NODES, AS DISCUSSED
IN PROP. 15. NOTE THAT IF k′ ∈ D2 , THAN COLUMN 9 APPLIES INSTEAD
OF COLUMN 8 FOR i ∈ S2 .
exponentially with t. Otherwise, if every player plays at least
once in O(N) turns, convergence occurs after O(N) steps.
Proof: We claim that the network, at any time, has the
following structure (Fig. 2): A type-A players’ clique, and at
most two type-B star centers 1, 2 ∈ TB . The larger ball’s center
is labelled as 1, and the smaller is 2. We denote the set of type-
B players which are members of the star centered about node
1 (2) as S1 and (correspondingly, S2). We have |S1| ≥ |S2| In
addition, some type-B players might be linked to two nodes
k, k′ ∈ TA, the set of these type-B players is denoted by L.
The set of type-A players that have a direct link with the star
center 1 (star center 2) is denoted by D1 (correspondingly
D2). Players {1, 2, k} form a clique. Assuming the second
star exists, it is connected to either players 1 or k′ (or both).
Finally, there may be additional links between players is L
and D2. An example of this network structure is presented in
Fig. 2.
We prove by induction. After the first three players played
the induction base case is true. We first assume that the link
(1, 2) and consider the case (1, 2) /∈ E later. Denote the active
d′(i, j) i ∈ n1 i ∈ n2 i ∈ n3
j = 1 2 2 2
j ∈ S1 2 3 2
j = 2 2 2 3
j ∈ S2 3 2 3
j ∈ L 3 3 2
j = k 2 2 2
j = k’ 2 3 2
j ∈ D2, j 6= k, k′ 2 2 2
j ∈ D1, j /∈ D2 2 3 2
j /∈ D1,j ∈ TA 3 3 2
Table II
THE SECOND SHORTEST DISTANCE d′(i, j) BETWEEN TWO NODES, AS
DISCUSSED IN PROP. 15. NOTE THAT IF k′ ∈ D2 , THAN COLUMN 9
APPLIES INSTEAD OF COLUMN 8 FOR i ∈ S2 .
player by r. Consider the following cases:
1. r ∈ TA: As c < A/2, r will form (or maintain) links
with every type-A player. If additional links to minor players
are to be formed, it is clearly better for player r to establish
links first with either player 1 or player 2 than to any player in
i ∈ S1 or i ∈ S2. We first consider the case where r /∈ D1∪D2
and split into two cases:
1A) If no two disjoint paths exists between player r to play-
ers 1 or 2, namely, if |TA| ≥ 2 and either |D1| < min{|TA|, 2}
or |D2| ≤ min {|TA|, 2}, then it is beneficial for both r and
the star centers to link such that reliability requirements will
be satisfied.
1B) If D2 6= ∅ then by establishing the edge (r, 1) we have
∆C(r, E + 1r) = c− 1 + |S1|
1 + δ
while by establishing (r, 2) the change of cost is:
∆C(r, E + 2r) = c− 1 + |S2|
1 + δ
. (1)
As |S2| ≤ |S1|, player r will prefer to establish first a link
with player 1 rather than with player 2. The link will be formed
if ∆C(1, E + 1r) ≤ 0, which is true if
|D1| ≤ 1
or (2)
cB < A/ (1 + δ) .
If condition 1 holds, then player r will attempt to form a link
with the star center 2, and succeed if condition 2 holds as
well. Establishing a link to any other type-B node is clearly
an inferior option, as if a player had decided to establish links
with either node 1 or node 2, an additional link to one of their
leafs will only reduce the distance to it by 1 and hence is not
a worthy course of action. Therefore, D2 ⊆ D1.
2. r ∈ TB and r 6= 1, 2. A player may disconnect itself and
then choose its two optimal links. Clearly, among the type-
A clique, player r′s best candidates are players k, k′, while
among the type-B players, the cost reduction is maximal by
linking to nodes 1, 2. In addition, a link to node k is at least
as preferred a link to k′, while a link to node 1 is always
preferred over a link to node 2 as long as n1 ≥ n2. Therefore,
we only need to consider three possible moves by player r -
linking to k, k′ (the red players in Fig. 2), linking to k, 1 or
linking to 1, 2.
Using tables I and II we can compare the cost of connecting
to nodes 1, 2 versus the costs of connecting to nodes 1 and k.
A simple calculation shows that if the expression
A− 1 + (|D1| − |D2|)A+ δ |S1| − |S2|+A+A(−|D2|)
1 + δ
is positive, than linking to players 1 and k is preferred over
linking to player 1 and 2. This expression is positive, as |D1| ≥
|D2 and |S2| ≤ |S1|.
In a similar fashion, we can compare between the choices
of linking to nodes 1 and k or forming links with nodes k and
k′. If the expression
1 + |S2| −A+ δ 1− |L| −A(−|D1|)
1 + δ
is positive, then establishing links to 1 and k is preferred,
otherwise the alternative will be chosen. Two special cases
are of interest: If |S2| < A − 1 and δ = 0, then every player
will prefer to link to k and k′. That is, we’ll get the optimal
configuration. If δ = 1, TA = D1, i.e, node 1 is a member of
the clique, |L| = 0 and |S2|  1, then a minor player will
connect to players 1 and k. Note that if there are no type-A
players present when r plays, then it must connect to the star
centers 1 and 2.
In addition, after r formed two links, no player x ∈ TA ∪
{1, 2}∪D1∪L will agree to form the link (x, r), as the induced
change of cost is
∆C(x,E + xr) ≥ cA − 1 > 0.
If cB ≤ 2 and δ → 0 then player r ∈ L and player x ∈ D2
will establish the link (x, r). By symmetry, this also happens
when r ∈ D2 and x ∈ L.
3. If r = 1, then it must maintain links to all nodes in
S2∪S1∪{2} (if there are any) in order to satisfy the reliability
criteria. Additional links to type-A players will be formed
according to the discussion in case 1, while no other links
to type-B player will be formed according to the discussion
in case 2.
4. If r = 2, then it must maintain links to all nodes in S2
(if there are any) in order to satisfy the reliability criteria. A
similar calculation to the one in case 2 shows that player 2’s
best course of action is to remain connected to player
In order to complete the induction proof all that is left is
to address the case (1, 2) /∈ E. In this case, player 2 must be
connected to at least one additional player i /∈ S2 in order to
have two disjoint path to every player in the network. Clearly,
its optimal choice is player k′. In order to maintain reliable
path to every i ∈ S2 ∪ {2} player k′ must agree to form
this link. Player 2 will disconnect (1, 2) if either ∆C(2, E −
12) ≤ 0 or ∆C(2, E − 12 + 2k′) ≤ 0 . However, if either
of this conditions hold, Tables I and II shows that for every
i ∈ TB/{2}, it would prefer to link to player k′ rather than
Figure 3. The optimal stable network, as described in Theorem 15.
player 2. In particular, this is also true for every node i ∈
S2. Therefore, as soon as every member in S2 played once,
the star will be empty and no additional star will raise again.
Therefore, there will be at most one star left in the network.
This completes the proof on the momentarily structure of the
network. Note that if |S1| = |S2| = ∅ we obtain the optimal
stable solution.
B) Since every minor player has either two or three links,
the contribution to the social cost due to minor players’ links
is o(|TB |), while the contribution to the social costs due to the
inter-distances between minor players is o
(
T 2B
)
. In the limit
|TA| → ∞, |TB |/|TA| → ∞, the dominant term in the cost
function is the term proportional to |TB |2. Both d(i, j) and
d′(i, j) for i, j ∈ TB are bounded by 3, and comparing this
results with the optimal social cost (Proposition 8) we have
S
Soptimal =
3T 2B + o(T
2
B)
2T 2B + o(T
2
B)
≤ 3
2
+ 
with → 0 in the limit |TA| → ∞, |TB |/|TA| → ∞.
C) The discussion of case 2 shows that in a large network,
it is suboptimal for a minor player to be a member of S2.
Given the the opportunity, it will prefer to become a member in
either S1 or L. Therefore, after every player has played at least
twice, S2 = ∅, and after every player has played four times the
system will reach equilibrium. Lemma 13 in [21] then shows
that the probability that the system has not converged by turn
t decays exponentially with t.
In section III we emphasized the importance of symmetry in
the reliability requirements for reducing the Price of Anarchy.
The next theorem affirms this assertion, and shows that if the
constraints are asymmetric, the system converges to a state
with an unbounded social cost on a large set of possible
dynamics and initial conditions.
Theorem 16. Assume asymmetric reliability requirements,
namely τ = 0. If the players follow Dynamic Rules #1 and
either Dynamic Rule #2a or #2b, then the system converges
to a state with an unbounded social cost.
Proof: The idea behind the proof is to show that the
reliability requirements of at least one minor player remain
unsatisfied, the therefore the social costs, as a sum over
individual costs, is unbounded.
First assume that cA > 2. We shall now show that at any
given turn, the network is composed of a type-A (possibly
empty) clique, a set of type-B players S linked to player x,
acting as a star center, and an additional (possibly empty) set
of type-B players L connected to the type-A player k. Player x
is also connected to player k. Some major player may establish
links with the star center x. The set of these major players is
denoted by D. Note that the cost of every player in either S or
L is ω (Q)→∞, since every path from each of these players
to the type-A clique crosses player k.
We prove by induction. At turn t ≤ 2, this is certainly true.
Denote the active player at time t as r. Consider the following
cases:
1. r ∈ TA: Since 1 < cA < A, all links to the other type-
A nodes will be established or maintained, if r is already
connected to the network. Clearly, the optimal link in r’s
concern is the link with the star center x. Therefore, player r
will attempt to establish the link (r, x) if
∆C(r, E + rx) = cA − |S| − 1 (3)
is negative. If cB < A/ (1 + δ) or that |D| ≤ 1 then x will
accept this link. Regardless, if player r has formed the link
it will not establish a link with i ∈ S, as it only reduces its
distance to player i by a single hop, and
∆C(r, E + ir) = cA − 1 ≤ 0. (4)
If Eq. 3 is positive, then, player r has no incentive to
establish a link with any i ∈ S, as |S| ≥ 1 and the by
establishing (i, r) the sole change is the reduction of d(i, r)
from 3 to 1,
∆C(r, E+ir) = cA−2 ≥ cA−|S|−1 = ∆C(r, E+rx) ≥ 0.
Eq. 4 also shows that if r 6= k, it will not form a link with
i ∈ L, while if r = k it may not remove the link (k, i) as
otherwise i is disconnected.
2. r ∈ TB , r 6= x : First, assume that r is a newly arrived
player, hence it is disconnected. Obviously, in its concern, a
link to the star’s center, player x, is preferred over a link to
any other type-B player. Similarly, a link to a player k is
preferred over a link to any other type-A player (or if L = ∅
and D = TA, equivalent to a link to any other type-A player).
Therefore, r first link choice would be either (r, k) or (r, x).
In other words, r ∈ L or r ∈ S. If r ∈ L, than no i ∈ TA will
agree to establish a link with r, as it only reduces its distance
from r by one hop, and doesn’t alter d(i, x) for any other x.
Similarly, if r ∈ S than
∆C(i, E + ri) = cA − 2 > 0
and the link would not be formed. Likewise, no link between
i ∈ L and j ∈ S may be formed, as
∆C(i, E + ij) = cB − 2 > cA − 2 > 0
3. r = x, the star’s center: r may not remove any edge con-
nected to a type-B player and render the graph disconnected.
On the other hand, the previous discussion shows it will not
establish additional links to nodes in L.
Note that the reliability requirements of players in L ∪ S
are invalidated. Therefore, the cost of every player j ∈ L∪ S
is at least Q, and we have Q → ∞. Hence, at any given
turn, as soon as either |L| > 1 and |S| ≥ 1, the social cost is
unbounded.
If cA < 2 a link between player i ∈ TA and player r ∈ TB
will be formed. However, as soon as player i becomes the
active player, it is beneficial for it to remove the link (i, r)
and establish a link to the star center (i, x) instead. Therefore,
after player i’s turn, the cost of player r is again ω(Q). In a
similar fashion, if cB < 2 than player i ∈ S and player j ∈ L
may establish the link (i, j). This does not affect any other
player and while it may reduce their costs, it does not provide
them with two disjoint paths to the type-A clique, as they both
must traverse player k in order to access it. Therefore, their
costs is still ω(Q).
Although, at first sight, it might seem that this result is
due to the greedy and myopic choice of edges, it is possible
to show that there are cases in which this result holds even
when players may pick their links strategically rather than in
a greedy manner. For example, if cA > 2 and the number
of minor players is odd, than a similar analysis shows that a
player in S ∪{x} will establish a link to a single player in L.
However, as the number of minor players is odd, there will
always be an unmatched player in either L or S and its cost
will be ω(Q).
C. Monetary Transfers
Recall that under the presence of monetary transfers, players
i and j will agree to establish an edge if ∆C(j, ij) +
∆C(i, ij) < 0. Nevertheless, it may be that during the active
player turn there are a few links that satisfy this condition,
and the player must prioritize them. Each player’s decision is
myopic, and is based solely on the current state of the network.
Hence, the order of establishing links is potentially important.
Needless to say, a player’s preference order will depend on
the link prices. While there are several alternatives, we adopt
the following preference order [21]:
Denote the active player as player i. Each link (i, j) carries
different utility in player i′s respect. It is reasonable to assume
that a link with a lower "connection value" will be priced
lower, so that the link with the least connection utility will
be marked with the lowest price. In fact, one may assume its
price will be as much as the implied cost of the other party of
this link. We will denote this price as P ∗. Every other player
x will use this value and demand an additional payment from
player i for the link (i, x), as it is more beneficial for player
i. Formally:
Definition 17. “Strategic” Pricing mechanism: Set j∗ as
the node that maximizes ∆C(i, E + ij∗). Set P ∗ =
max{−∆C(j∗, E, ij∗), 0}. Finally, set αij = ∆C(i, E+ij)−
(∆C(i, E + ij∗) + P ∗) . The price that player j requires in
order to establish (i, j) is Pij = max{0, αij ,−∆C(j, E+ij)}.
Under this pricing mechanism, there could be many links
that carry the same utility. Some of these links have a better
connection value, but they come at a higher price. Since
all the links carry the same utility, we need to decide on
some preference mechanism for player i. The simplest one
Figure 4. The “entangled cycles” motif. a) Six minor player are connected in
an “entangled cycles” subgraph. The first two nodes have direct connection to
some major player, and access the rest of the network by the major player’s
additional links, represented by the dotted line. b) If at some point, a link
between a player in this subgraph and some external player is formed (in this
example, a major player), some links may be removed without violating the
reliability requirement and without increasing the distance cost appreciably.
The removed links marked by a red X.
is the “cheap” choice, in which, if there are a few equivalent
links, the player will choose the cheapest one. This can be
a reasonable choice, as new players cannot spend too much
resources, and therefore they will choose the “cheapest” option
that belongs to the set of links with maximal utility.
Definition 18. Preference order: Player i will establish links
with player j if player j minimizes ∆C˜(i, ij) = ∆C(i, ij) +
Pij and ∆C˜(i, ij) < 0. If there are several players that
minimize ∆C˜(i, ij), then player i will establish a link with
a player that minimizes Pij . If there are several players that
satisfy the previous condition, then one out of them is chosen
randomly.
We are now at a position to identify an additional network
motif, namely, the “entangled cycles”. This network motif is
composed of a line (i.e., interconnected sequence) of minor
players’ nodes, with some cross-links between the nodes along
this line, breaking the hierarchy (Fig. 4). The “entangled
cycle” of length three is the “feedback loop” motif, which was
previously found to exist in a higher frequency than expected
in the Internet graph [24].
When a new minor player arrives, it will choose the two
cheapest links and will connect to the corresponding players.
Clearly, its costs due to the distance from the rest of the
network will be the highest. As such, when the next player
arrives, it will offer the lowest link price. The new arrival
will link to it and to one of its provider. The process will
repeat, until, at some point, an existing player will decide that
this growing branch is too far from it, and will connect to
one of the nodes along this “entangled cycles”. At this point,
this subgraph will be over-saturated with links as players may
utilize this link to access the Internet core. Hence, some links
will be removed (see, for example Fig. 4(b)). The set of the
links that will be removed depends heavily on the playing
order and the temporary network structure. Nevertheless, some
cross-links may remain in order to satisfy reliability constrains.
This explains the following result.
Theorem 19. Assume the number of major players is at least
10. Denote the distance cost of player i ∈ Tβ , β ∈ {A,B},
as D(i), namely
D(i) = Cβ(i)− cβdeg(i) · xi
Assume that a subset W of minor player first join the game and
play consecutively and that the two players with the maximal
distance cost are adjacent. Then:
A) These players will form an “entangled cycles” structure
of length l, as depicted in Fig. 4, and
l ≤ 2
√
(A|TA|)2 + 5A− 2A|TA|.
B) The “entangled cycles” structure is semi-stable, in the
following sense: If, at some later turn, there exist players j /∈
W , i ∈W such that the link (i, j) is formed (Fig. 4(b)), then
some links in the “entangled cycles” structure may be removed
in subsequent turns.
Proof: A) Assume that at time t a subset of W =
{x1, x2...xm} minor players first join the game. Denote the
set of players that are currently connected to the network by
N ′. We denote by nA (nB) the number of type A players
(correspondingly, type-B player) at that moment. Let us denote
the players with the highest distance cost term as x0 and x1,
namely,
x0 = arg max
i∈N ′
D(i)
x−1 = arg max
i∈N ′\{x−1}
D(i)
where for simplicity we assumed that x−1, x−2 are minor
player (type-B players). According to the “strategic” pricing
mechanism a new player will establish links with these players,
as they will offer the cheapest links. Note that by connecting
to these players, its survivability requirements are satisfied, as
each of these players maintain two disjoint path to every major
player (if the reliability requirements are asymmetric) or to all
other players (in case of symmetric reliability requirements).
We are now going to prove by induction that player xj will
first connect to players xj−1 and xj−2. We shall prove by
this by proving that the distance costs of xj−1 and xj−2 are
maximal.
First, note that for every player xj′ = 1...j − 1, we have
D(xj′) ≥ D(xj′−1) and D(xj′) > D(xj′−2), since the path
from j’ to every player in N ′ pass through xj′−1 or xj′−2,
and N ′  l > |W |. Therefore, in order to show that players
xj−1 and xj−2 have the highest distance cost, it is sufficient
to show that D(xj−1) > D(y) for every y ∈ N ′. For every
player i ∈ N ’ we have
d(xj−1, i) ≥ d(x0, i) + bj/2c
d′(xj−1, i) ≥ d′(x0, i) + bj/2c
since the path that connects player xj−1 to the any player
i ∈ N ′ crosses either player x0 or x−1, which are adja-
cent. Therefore, the distance cost of player xj−1 due to its
distance from every player i ∈ N ′, denoted by D˜(xj−1)
is at least grater than the corresponding distance cost of
player x0, D˜(x0) by at least A bj/2cnA + bj/2cnB . Note
that D˜(x0) ≥ D˜(y) for every y ∈ N ′ according to the
definition of x0. However, player xj′−1 may be closer to
players {x1, x2...xj−2} than player y. Denote the maximal
distance between any two players by r. We have,
D(xj−1)−D(y) ≥ A bj/2cnA + bj/2cnB − r · j
where r is the maximal distance between two players. In
proposition 11 it was shown that
r ≤ 2
⌊√
(A|TA|)2 + 5c−A|TA|
⌋
|
≤ 2
√
(A|TA|)2 + 5A− 2A|TA|
Hence,
D(xj−1)−D(y) ≥ A bj/2cnA + bj/2cnB − r · j
As |TA| > 10 this expression is positive. Hence, links will
be established as stated. This shows that at the time player xj
joins the game, the distance cost of player xj−1 is maximal.
A similar calculation shows that at this turn, the distance cost
D(xj−2) is maximal in the set {D(i)|i ∈ N ′ ∪ {x1, ..xj−2}}.
We have thus far shown that the first two links of a new
player xj are to players xj−1 and xj−2. Nevertheless, as the
“entangled cycles” motif grows, the incentive of other players
to connect to players in it increases. At some point, player j
may be able to form links with players not in W , or an active
player r /∈ W may decide to connect to some player in W
(or vice versa for r ∈W ). In either of these cases, players in
the “entangled cycles” motif may have three disjoint paths to
other players, and may therefore remove a link, should they
deemed to do so. In this case, the “entangled cycles” motif
will be diluted.
This theorem shows that reliability is a major factor in
breaking up tree hierarchy in the Internet. In addition, it also
hints that the hierarchical structure does not break frequently
in the top levels of the Internet, but rather mostly in the
intermediate and lower tiers. Note that according to Theorem
19(B), in large networks the length of the “entangled motifs”
is short. Therefore, we do not expect to see excessively long
structures, but rather small ones, having just a few ASs.
V. DATA ANALYSIS
In this section we compare our theoretical predictions with
the real-world inter-AS topology graph [26]. We classified
ASs to major players and minor players according the popular
CAIDA ranking [27]. For the sake of comparison with previ-
ous work [21], we classified the major players as the top 100
ASs according to this ranking.
In Section III-A, we showed that, by allowing monetary
transfers, the maximal cycle length connecting a major player
to a minor player depends inversely on the number of major
players. As the number of ASs increases in time, it is reason-
able that the number of major player grows as well. Hence,
we expect that the length of the shortest cycle connecting a
major player to a minor player will decrease in time. Fig. 5
shows the mean cycle length connecting one of the secondary
Figure 5. The mean length of the shortest cycle connecting a major player
and a minor player as function of time, from January 2006 to October 2008.
The length decrease as time passes and the network grows, in agreement with
our model.
Figure 6. The ratio of the mean number of disjoint paths connecting a minor
player to the core to the mean degree of a minor player. This ratio is above
0.95, and increases in time, showing that additional links are likely to part of
disjoint paths to the core. This ratio is presented as a function of time from
January 2006 to October 2008.
leading 2000 ASs, ranked 101-2100 in CAIDA ranking, and
one of the top 100 nodes. The steady decline of the cycle’s
length in time is predicted by our model.
Our analysis showed that in most of the generated topolo-
gies, the minor players are organized in small subgraphs that
have direct connection to the Internet core, namely the major
players clique, or the tier-1 subgraph, in agreement with [21].
In order to maintain a reliable connection, in each subgraph
there must be at least two links that connect minor players to
the core. Indeed, we have found out that the ratio between the
mean number of disjoint paths from a minor player to the core
and the mean degree of minor players is more than 0.95, and
it increases in time (Fig. 6). That is, almost every outgoing
link of a minor player is used to provide it with an additional,
disjoint path to the core. In other words, a player is more likely
to establish an additional link, hence increase its degree, if it
supplies it with a new path to the core that does not intersect
its current paths.
In section IV we predicted the ubiquity of two network
motifs, the “double star” motif (Fig. 2) and the “entangled
cycles” motif (Fig. 4). We define the occurrence of a “double
star” motif as the existence of a a connected pair of nodes,
Figure 7. Example of network motifs. a) An “entangled cycle” motif of
size four. b) A sample of the “double-star” motif, as found in the real-world
inter-AS topology. The star centers are in pink and green. The nodes that are
common to both stars are in purple.
each with degree greater than m, designated as the centers,
such that at least m neighbors of one center are also neighbors
of the other center. We generated random networks according
to the Configuration Model (CM), in which each node is
given a number of stubs according to its degree, and stubs are
connected uniformly. Then, we evaluated the mean number of
occurrences of this motif in a random CM network with the
same number of nodes and the same degree distribution as
the real inter-AS topology. For m = 2, we have found 28.8K
occurrences in the real-world inter-AS topology, whereas the
mean number of occurrences in the random CM network
was only 5.8K ± 1.3K instances (the ± indicates standard
deviation). Namely, there are more than four times displays of
this subgraph in the Internet than in a random network with
the same degree distribution. Chebyshev’s inequality provides
a bound on the p-value, p < 0.003. This low value indicates
that it is highly unlikely that a random CM network explains
the frequent appearance of this network motif. We have tested
the prevalence of this motif with other values of m and the
number of occurrences is consistently a few times more than
expected in a random CM network. Our analysis suggests that
reliability considerations is one of the factors leading to the
increased number of incidents.
The unexpected prevalence of the “feedback loop”, which
is a special case of the “entangled cycles” motif, was first
reported in [24]. The “feedback loop” motif coincides with the
"entangled cycles" motif of length three, and in order to further
assess our results we tested for the occurrence frequency of
the “entangled cycles” motif of length four. We compared
the number of occurrences of this motif in the real-world
Internet graph to the expected number of occurrences in a
random Configuration Model network. While the number of
instances of this motif in the Internet graph was 27.7M , the
expected number of occurrences in the random network was
only 1.3M ±0.8M . As before, the abundance of this network
motif, an order of magnitude greater than expected (p < 0.001,
a relaxed bound based on Chebyshev’s inequality) provides a
positive indication to the implications of survivability require-
ments.
In summary, we have provided both static and dynamic em-
pirical evidence that conform with our predictions, suggesting
the importance of reliability considerations on the structure
and dynamics of the inter-AS topology.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While many studies have tried to model the Internet struc-
ture, the list of works the explicitly address reliability con-
siderations is much shorter. Furthermore, most of the theo-
retical models of the Internet structure and dynamics assume
homogenous agents, while the Internet is inherently heteroge-
neous, composed of a wide variety of entities with different
business models. In this work, we found that constructing a
model that includes these two factors, namely reliability and
heterogeneity, may provide important insights on the Internet
structure and dynamics.
We first rigorously formulated a model of a network forma-
tion game in this context. Our model is flexible, and may be
used in a wide variety of settings. It allows for many variations
and schemes, for example situations in which failures are fre-
quent or rare, or to account for varying centrality of different
types of players. The homogeneity of the model also allows
us to describe scenarios in which a fallback route is required
only to a subset of players. Indeed, a reasonable AS policy is
to require a backup routing path only to the Internet backbone,
rather than establishing fault-tolerant routing pathways to
every particular Autonomous System.
We established the Price of Reliability, which measures the
excess social cost that is required in order to maintain network
survivability in an optimal stable equilibrium. Surprisingly,
we showed that it can be smaller than one, that is, that the
additional survivability constraints add to the social utility. We
have also showed that reliability requirements have disparate
effects on different parts of the network. While it may support
dilution in dense areas, it facilitates edges formation in sparse
areas, and in particular it supports the formation of edges
connecting minor players and major players.
In our dynamic analysis we have found the repetitive
appearance of small sub-graphs, or network motifs, namely the
“entangled cycles” motif and the “double star” motif. Indeed,
the number of appearance of these motifs in the real Inter-
AS topology surpassed the expected number by a few folds,
indicating that additional factors support their formation, and
as our analysis shows, survivability is one of them. We have
also predicted that the length of the minimal cycle connecting
a major player to a minor player should decrease in time. This
prediction, too, was verified by a dynamic data analysis.
Finally, while our analysis focuses on the inter-AS topology,
it may be applied to other networks as well, that are composed
of heterogeneous, rational agents that are required to maintain
some reliability aspects. Primary examples are trade networks
and MVNO operators in the cellular market.
In this work we have shown that a game theoretic analysis of
network formation, which encompasses heterogeneous agents
and explicitly addresses survivability concerns, holds promis-
ing results. Nevertheless, there are many open questions, such
as the following. How does the emerging network handle more
than a single failure? Which incentive mechanism will promote
increased reliability of the future Internet? What can a com-
parative analysis of experimental results on different networks
tell us about the players’ strategies in each network? These,
and many more, indicate that there is yet a lot to uncover
in this intersection between network formation, heterogeneity
and reliability.
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